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ARGUMENT 
I. QUESTIONS OF FACT PRECLUDE ENTRY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 
STOKES, TANNER, AND WOOD'S WRONGFUL TERMINATION CLAIM. 
In its brief, Farm Bureau largely ignored the fact that the agents presented evidence that 
Darrin Ivie and other Farm Bureau managers modified the March 1994 contracts after the agents 
signed them. Instead, Farm Bureau focuses on a point that is uncontested by the agents—that the 
October 14, 1993, letters were superceded by the March 1994 contracts. Indeed, Farm Bureau 
cited both Ryan v. Dan's Food Stores, 972 P.2d 395 (Utah 1998) and Trembly v. Mrs. Fields 
Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306 (Ut. Ct. App. 1994) for the proposition that a preexisting employment 
contract can be unilaterally modified by the employer. Appellees' Brief at 23. The agents agree 
with this point and further assert that the employment relationship was modified not once but 
twice by Farm Bureau, and it is the second modification that made the relationship terminable for 
cause. Farm Bureau modified the at-will provisions of the March 1994 contracts by Darrin Ivie's 
repeated references to the prior October 15 letters, which promised continued employment if 
certain production standards were met. Farm Bureau cannot rely on Ryan and Trembly when it is 
convenient to its arguments and ignore these cases when they support the agents' claims. 
The agents have consistently claimed that the October 14 letters were reasserted, 
repeatedly, as the standard of employment after the March 1994 contracts were signed. The 
agents accepted this modification by staying in Farm Bureau's employ. See Trembly, 884 P.2d at 
1314. Farm Bureau's response to this point is that there was no "meeting of the minds" for this 
modification. However, a "meeting of the minds" is a factual question for the jury, not the court. 
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See Sanderson v. First Sec, Leasing Co,, 844 P.2d 303, 306 (Utah 1992); R, J, Daum Constr, Co. 
v. Child, 247 P.2d 817, 818 (Utah 1952)("If there was evidence from which it would be 
reasonable to find that there was a meeting of the minds, [summary judgment] cannot be 
sustained.")- The trial court had evidence before it that the contract had indeed been modified 
and should have allowed the jury to decide whether there was an implied-in-fact contract. 
Evidence of the employer's intention to modify an at-will relationship may include letters, 
bulletins, oral statements, and the employer's course of conduct. See Berube v. Fashion Centre 
Ltd,, 111 P.2d 1033, 1044 (Utah 1989). The agents testified that Mr. Ivie continued to hold out 
the October 15 letters as the standard of employment and that Mr. Ivie referred to these letters in 
weekly meetings with the agents after the March 1994 contracts were signed. R.463, 472. 
Furthermore, Jay Wood specifically testified that he believed that the October 15 letter continued 
to govern his employment relationship. R.472. Most compelling is the promise of continued 
employment contained in the October 15 letters that Mr. Ivie continually referred to: 
As discussed at the end of the first quarter of 1994 VA of these production standards must 
be written and transmitted to the home office. At the end of the second quarter Vi of these 
production standards must be issued (these numbers will be reflected on the 12 month 
rolling average production report). At that time if the numbers are less than expected I 
will begin recruiting to find your replacement. It will take me approximately 90-120 
days to prepare someone to take your place. At the end of the third quarter I will once 
again revisit your results. At that time one of two things could happen: 
1. I see that your numbers meet the expected result at that time I will simply 
hire the new agent and increase our compliment or 
2. If after I look at the numbers the results are still not there the new agent will 
move into your office. 
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(See Ex. 9 of Appellants' Opening Brief.)(emphasis added.) These letters do not merely set out 
a "goal" for the agents to meet to avoid termination, but also make a promise to the agents that 
they will have time to meet these goals and be retained if they are met. Based on these facts, a 
reasonable jury could find that the 1994 Career Agent Contracts were modified by an implied-in-
fact contract created by Mr. Ivie's re-affirmance of the October 15 letters and his meetings with 
the agents regarding their progress under the terms of the October 15 letters. 
Farm Bureau also alleges that Mr. Stokes contradicted his deposition testimony with an 
affidavit submitted after his deposition was taken. This is simply not true and is not supported 
by the testimony cited by Farm Bureau. The agents, including Mr. Stokes, have consistently 
argued that the modified employment contract ran through the third quarter of 1994. Thus, Mr. 
Stokes' "no" answer to the question "Did he ever tell you, if you do meet the goals I'm not going 
to terminate you everV is not inconsistent or inaccurate. See Appellees' Brief at 28 (emphasis 
added). Neither Mr. Stokes, nor any other plaintiff, has asserted that Farm Bureau guaranteed 
lifetime employment if the agents met their 1994 third quarter production goals, which was the 
clear meaning of Mr. Minnock's question. 
In short, the trial court plainly infringed on the exclusive province of the jury, which is to 
decide factual disputes, when it ruled that the March 1994 contracts controlled the employment 
arrangement. At the very least there is a question of fact as to whether Mr. Ivie's actions and 
statements created an implied in fact contract which modified the 1994 Career Agent Contracts 
precluding summary judgment. 
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II. FARM BUREAU MADE INACCURATE AND INAPPROPRIATE FACTUAL 
ARGUMENTS CONCERNING LEO SYPHUS. 
In its brief, Farm Bureau argues, for the first time, that Leo Syphus actually received his 
termination letter on September 27, 1994—three days before his termination became effective. 
This argument was not made at any stage of the proceeding below and relies on an inadmissible 
piece of hearsay evidence that Farm Bureau never attempted to authenticate or introduce prior to 
this appeal. Farm Bureau argued below that "on or about September 12, 1994, Mr. Syphus was 
sent a letter by Utah Farm Bureau informing that his contract with Utah Farm Bureau was 
terminated" (See Farm Bureau's Memo in Support of Mot. Sum. Judgment at 22, attached hereto 
as Exhibit 19) and Farm Bureau also adopted the assertion that Mr. Syphus "received his 
termination letter on or about September 12, 1994." See Farm Bureau's Reply Memo at 14, 
attached hereto as Exhibit 20. 
It was upon this September 12 termination date, not the date now asserted by Farm 
Bureau, that the trial court based its decision. Accordingly, the facts before the trial court were 
that Mr. Syphus was terminated eighteen days prior to his production quota deadline. Farm 
Bureau argues that even if there was a modified employment contract, Mr. Stokes failed to 
actually meet the goals by September 30, 1994. This argument ignores the fact that Farm Bureau 
by firing Mr. Syphus eighteen days before September 30, 1994, Farm Bureau committed an 
anticipatory breach of the contract, which excused Mr. Syphus' continued performance. 
Common sense also dictates that an employee cannot be expected to continue working for an 
employer that has confiscated his books and summarily fired him. In fact, before he was 
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terminated Mr. Syphus was on pace to meet the property and casualty minimums set in the June 
30 letter, and had several leads to meet his life minimum, which could be met with only one sale. 
See Syphus Depo. at 33-36, 86-88 (Ex. 4 to Appellants' Opening Brief). Mr. Syphus also needed 
to complete 40-50 "client reviews" which are nothing more than short telephone interviews with 
existing clients. Mr. Syphus had already completed over 85 client reviews and could have 
finished the task by conducting less than three client reviews per day. This information alone is 
sufficient to show that Mr. Syphus had "the ability to perform all such conditions" of the 
anticipatorily breached contract, as stated by Petersen v. Intermountain Capital Corporation, 508 
P.2d 536, 538 (Utah 1973). Whether or not Mr. Syphus "could" or "would" have made these 
sales if he had not been fired is a hypothetical question assigned to the jury, not the court. 
III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS IMPROPERLY GRANTED AS TO THE 
OWNERSHIP OF THE AGENTS' BOOKS OF BUSINESS. 
Because the Career Agents were independent contractors, not regular employees, there 
are actually two businesses involved: the agents' business and Farm Bureau's business. Contrary 
to Farm Bureau's assertions, the "Accounts and Records" provision of the contract is ambiguous 
because it declares that "All accounts, account records, policyholder files, policyholder lists, rate 
books or manuals, applications and other forms and all other records in Career Agent's 
possession pertaining to Companies' business will be the property of Companies and will be 
returned to Companies upon demand." See Career Agent Contract [^5(b) (Ex 5 of Appellant's 
Opening Brief) (emphasis added). This language, which only requires the agents to return 
documents pertaining to Farm Bureau's business, is consistent with the notion that the Career 
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Agents are independent contractors running a separate business with separate business records. 
Moreover, the contract does not expressly require the agents to relinquish records pertaining to 
their own, independent, businesses. 
It is not clear, based on the language alone, that Farm Bureau had the right to confiscate 
every document relating to a Farm Bureau insurance policy that the agents had created in their 
businesses. This ambiguity requires the court to look to the course of conduct to determine the 
parties' intent as to the retention of records pertaining to the Career Agent's business. This 
conduct includes, inter alia, telling the Career Agents at hiring that the book of business was 
theirs and that they could retire on it, compensating the Career Agents for voluntarily parting 
with accounts from their books of business, and requiring the Career Agents to purchase all the 
account records and forms on which information concerning the book of business were kept. 
Because the contract is ambiguous, a reasonable fact finder could find that the agents owned 
their books of business based upon Farm Bureau's course of conduct and representations as to 
ownership. 
REMAINING ARGUMENTS 
The remainder of Farm Bureau's brief does not set forth any new matters as under Utah 
R. App. Pro. 25(c) therefore the appellants rely on the arguments set forth in their opening brief 
to rebut Farm Bureau's arguments concerning the issues of good faith and fair dealing, unjust 
enrichment, and punitive damages. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Career Agents have demonstrated that material facts remain to be decided in this 
case. We ask this court to vacate the order granting summary judgment and remand the case to 
the Second District Court for further proceedings. 
DATED this 18th day of October, 2000. 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JAY L. WOOD. DARRELL K. TANNER, 




UTAH FARM BUREAU INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation, FARM 
BUREAU LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY; an Iowa Corporation and 
FBL INSURANCE COMPANY, an Iowa 
corporation, 
Defendants. 
Defendants, by and through their counsel of record, respectfully submit the following 
Memorandum in Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment: 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 970906166CV 
Honorable Michael D. Lyon 
$335.00 per week in life insurance premiums, and $1,107 in property and casualty premiums, he 
would be terminated on September 30, 1994. 
Mr. Syphus concedes that he did not meet the goals set forth in the letter for client 
reviews: 
THE WITNESS: They had us doing these review sheets, you know, concerning 
their whole insurance, like an annual fact finder, and as I recall, I had about 85 to 
90 of those signed, and as I'd go around the community or through the farm areas, 
why, if I'd see one of my insureds, I'd stop and say, "I've got to do this," and I'd 
say, "Just sign this and I'll take it back to the office and fill in the rest of the 
information on your insurance." And so I don't know what happened to it, but I 
figured I had around 85 or 90 of them. And that would be in 60 days. 
Q. (By Mr. Minnock) Well, and you needed 130, according to this letter? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. So you were still 40 short. Forty to 50 short? 
A. Yeah. 
(Deposition of Leo Syphus, pp. 32-33, attached as Exhibit "D"). He also concedes that he did not 
meet the requirements set forth in the letter with respect to life insurance production: 
Q. Do you know whether you met your goal, which was set out in the June 30th, 
1994 letter, of getting $330 per week in life? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you make it? 
A. No. 
Q. You didn't make it? 
A. No. 
(Id. at 35-36). On or about September 12, 1994, Mr. Syphus was sent a letter by Utah Farm 
Bureau informing that his contract with Utah Farm Bureau was terminated effective September 
30, 1994. (See Letter from Ron Palmer to Leo Syphus, attached as Exhibit "J"). 
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Defendants, by and through their counsel of record, respectfully submit the following 
Reply Memorandum in Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment: 
Webster v. 5/7/, 675 P.2d 1170, 1173 (Utah 1983). Mr. Stokes has provided no explanation of 
the reason for this abrupt change in his testimony, and his subsequent affidavit cannot be used to 
avoid summary judgment. Defendants did not breach any agreement by terminating the 
Plaintiffs. 
B. DEFENDANTS DID NOT BREACH THE AGREEMENT BY TERMINATING LEO 
SYPHUS. 
Perhaps the easiest way to examine Leo Syphus' claim for wrongful termination of his 
agency contract is to rely upon very basic contract principles. If we assume that the June 30, 
1994, letter to Mr. Syphus constituted a contract,3 then in exchange for Mr. Syphus' agreement to 
meet certain production goals by September 30, 1994, Defendants would not terminate him. If 
Mr. Syphus did not meet those goals, then Defendants had no obligation to retain him after 
September 30, 1994. 
The Plaintiffs apparently have no quarrel with this approach, but rather contend that Mr. 
Syphus did not have until September 30, 1994, to meet those goals, because he received his 
termination letter on or about September 12, 1994. However, the Plaintiffs concede that the 
3
 The Plaintiffs suggest that Defendants do not dispute that the letters from the agency 
managers to the Plaintiffs modified their contracts. Actually, Defendants do dispute that any of 
the letters constituted a legally binding modification to their at-will agency. Rather, the 
Defendants' submit that whether the letters did in fact modify the relationship is immaterial 
because they either met the terms of the agreement in Mr. Syphus' case, or that the terms of the 
modification are no longer enforceable due to the subsequent contracts in the case of Mr. Stokes, 
Mr. Tanner, and Mr. Wood. 
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letter provided that the termination was to become effective September 30, 1994. Mr. Syphus 
testified that he fiilly understood that he was still a licensed insurance agent for Defendants until 
September 30, 1994, and could have lawfully sold policies for Defendants until that date: 
Q. Well, but according to the Utah insurance commissioner, you're still appointed 
with them until September 30, 1994, right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you're still authorized to accept applications until September 30, 1994, 
correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. So until September 30, 1994, there was nothing to prevent you from 
going out and getting applications and submitting them to the company, correct? 
A. No. 
(Deposition of Leo Syphus, pp. 88-89, attached as Exhibit "A"). Mr. Syphus was given the full 
measure of time permitted by the June 30. 1994, letter to meet his production goals, but he failed 
to do so. Mr. Syphus could have submitted applications meeting his goals by September 30, 
1994, and then demanded that Defendants perform their obligations under the alleged contract by 
retaining him. Mr. Syphus chose not to do so. Therefore, pursuant to standard contract 
principles, Mr. Syphus did not perform the consideration required of him under the terms of the 
contract, and Defendants therefore had no duty to perform any alleged duty to retain him after 
September 30, 1994. 
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